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Summary findings
East Asia's financial crisis has been attributed in part to  Japan and Korea. Those differences in performance were
the weak performance and risky financial structures of  not fully reflected in sales growth, as investment rates
Asian corporations. In the period before Asia's financial  were high and continued to drive output growth in all
crisis, however, analysts were not suggesting that the  countries.
financial structures of many East Asian corporations  These stylized facts suggest that the East Asian miracle
would be unable to withstand the combined shocks of  was indeed based on a vibrant corporate sector.
increased interest rates, depreciated currencies, and large  But the combination of high investment and relatively
drops in domestic demand.  low profitability in some countries meant that much
To document the basic record of corporate  external financing was needed. Outside equity was used
performance and financing structures for East Asian  sparingly  -in  part because stock markets were
corporations,  Claessens, Djankov, and Lang analyze data  depressed (Japan) or because insiders preferred to retain
for 5,550  firms in nine countries for the period 1988-96.  control - so borrowing was heavy in most East Asian
They find large differences in performance and financial  countries, and leverage increased in the years before
structure across countries.  1996 in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand.
Profitability - as measured by real return on assets  Risk increased as short-term (foreign exchange)
(ROA) in local currency - was relatively low in Hong  borrowing became increasingly important  in the  1990s,
Kong, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Singapore in  especially in Malaysia, Taiwan (China), and Thailand.
the decade before the crisis. Corporations  in Indonesia,  In other words, it is now apparent that some of the
the Philippines, and Thailand averaged high returns - vulnerabilities in corporate  financial structures that were
roughly double those in Germany and the United States  to become an important  factor in East Asia's financial
for the same period.  crisis already existed in the early 1990s, although they
In 1994-96,  measured performance declined  were not noted at the time.
somewhat in several East Asian countries, especially
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The East Asian financial crisis has in part been attributed to the weak performance and
risky  financial  structures of  corporates.  Ex-post,  it has  become  clear  that  the operational
performance of East Asian corporates was indeed not as stellar as many had thought and in fact
involved investment with high risks.  Also ex-post, it has become apparent that the financial
structures of many East Asian corporates could not withstand the combined shocks of increased
interest  rates,  depreciated  currencies,  and  large  drops  in  domestic  demand.  This  poor
performance and risky financing structures of East Asian corporates were, however, not notably
featured among observers writing on East Asia prior to the financial crisis.  Quite the opposite,
East Asian corporates were considered an important contributing part of the East Asian miracle
and  were  generally  viewed upon  as  very  competitive  and  adept  at  exploiting  new  market
opportunities, and consequently attracted considerable amounts of (foreign) capital.
Reconciling the differences between these ex-post and ex-ante view will likely be a topic of
much future research.'  In this note, we are less ambitious and start with documenting the basic
record in corporate perfornance  and financing structures for East Asian corporates over the last
decade.  Analyzing whether this record led or contributed to a financial crisis will be pursued in
future work. We use a database of balance sheet and income statement data for 5550 East Asian
firms in nine countries over the period 1988-1996 for establishing the stylized facts on corporate
performance and financing structures. The main data source are annual reports of the companies
listed on the major stock exchanges in the region.
We  find  large  differences  in  performance  and  financial  structures  across  countries.
Profitability, as measured by real return on assets (ROA) in local currency, was relatively low in
Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Singapore throughout the period, while corporates in Indonesia,
the Philippines, and Thailand had high returns, on average twice higher than those recorded in
Germany  and  the  United  States  over  the  same  period.  In  the  years  1994-1996, measured
performance declined somewhat in  several East Asian countries,  especially Japan and Korea.
These differences in performance did not show up as much in sales growth as investment rates
were high  and  continued to  drive output growth rates in  all countries.  These stylized  facts
suggest that the East Asian miracle was indeed based on a vibrant corporate sector.
However,  the  combination  of  high  investment  and  relatively  low  profitability  in  some
countries meant that much external financing was needed.  As outside equity was used sparingly,
partly as stock markets were depressed (Japan) or because insiders preferred to retain control,
leverage was high in most East Asian countries, and increasing in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand.
This  created  large  risks  as  short-term  (foreign  exchange)  borrowing  became  increasingly
important in the last few years, especially in  Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand.  Some of the
vulnerabilities in corporate financial structures that have now become a very apparent factor in
Two companion papers use the same data to study specific aspects of the behavior of corporations in East Asia.
Claessens et al. (1998a) investigates the patter of diversification into vertically related, complementary related, and
unrelated  businesses.  Claessens  et  al.  (1998b)  examines the  link  between  ownership  structure  and  corporate
performance.
2triggering and aggravating East Asia's  financial crisis, were thus already in existence in the early
1990s.
2.  Data
The data come from annual reports of the companies listed on the major stock exchanges in
the region and come from Worldscope and Extel databases. The datasets are unbalanced, i.e., the
number of observations varies from year to year. We have excluded companies, which report
data less than three times over the period 1988-96. We have also excluded financial and banking
institutions  (SIC6000-6999). Finally, in  any given year, we  exclude companies  which  do not
include all of the following variables - net sales, net income after taxes, cost of goods sold, total
assets, and the value of common equity. The data set consists of 588 companies in Hong Kong,
317 companies in Indonesia, 2526 companies in Japan, 392 companies in Korea, 772 companies
in  Malaysia,  170 companies  in  Philippines, 348  companies  in  Singapore, 265  companies  in
Taiwan, and 564 companies in Thailand.
Several caveats apply to the data. First, the statistics we report do not attempt to correct for
cross-country differences in industrial structure. If a country data set has many utility firms, for
example, average leverage might be higher and profitability lower. A forthcoming  companion
paper breaks down the sample into sectors (based on two-digit SIC codes) to provide a more
accurate comparison of company performance across countries. The data also cover mainly large
firms-the  median  size  of  the  5550  firms  is  4273  employees,  with  the  largest  company
employing more than  150,000 employees. This selection pattern arises since firms have to be
listed on a stock exchange in order to enter the database, and listed companies tend to be large.
The bias towards larger companies may be problematic if one were studying the effect of the
Asian financial crises on the corporate sector. It does not pose a problem here, since we focus on
the years preceding the crisis, when (as critics argue) large companies were at the root of the
corporate and financial sector difficulties.
Whenever possible, we have compared the main variables of interest with those reported in
other studies,  in  particular  Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic  (1995),  Glen  et al.  (1998), and
Goldman  Sachs  (1998).2  We  also  cross-checked the  data  for  Japan  with  the  Comparative
Economic and Financial Statistic for  Japan and other Major Countries, published by the Bank
of  Japan  and  the  OECD Financial  Statistics  Part  3,  Financial Statements  of Non-Financial
Enterprises. The similarity in calculations-large  companies are also used there-provides  some
comfort in the robustness of our results.
2  Pomerleano  (1998) also analyzes East Asian corporations.  He uses alternative  measures of performance  and
leverage  that are not easily  comparable  with  the statistics  in this study.
33.  Performance Measures
As our first measure of performance we use the real rate of return on assets (ROA) in local
currency. This is calculated at the firm level as the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) in
local currency over total assets minus the annual inflation rate in the country. The advantage of
this measure is that it is not influenced by the liability structure of the corporate, as it excludes
interest payments, financial income, and other income or expenses. Table  1 shows that across
countries, East Asian corporates have had quite different ROAs.  Relatively low profitability
rates have been recorded by corporates from Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Singapore with real
ROAs on average of about 5%.  High-profitability countries, at least for most of the period we
study,  have  been  Indonesia, the  Philippines,  and  Thailand.  Corporates  in  these  countries
averaged real ROAs of about 9%-10% for the whole period.  ROAs for corporates in Malaysia
and Taiwan fall in between these two groups, but their returns of about 7% are still closer to the
high performers.  These ROAs can be compared to ROAs in Germnany  and the United States 3 of
about  5  percent,  providing  support  to  the  notion  that  the  corporate  sector  contributed
significantly to the East Asian Miracle during most of this period.
Table 1: Return on Assets for Nine Asian Countries, Germany and the US
(%, medians, in real local currency)
Country  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1988-96
Hong  Kong  5.1  5.3  4.9  4.8  4.5  3.8  3.9  3.9  4.1  4.6
Indonesia  n.a.  n.a.  9.4  9.1  8.6  7.9  7.4  6.2  6.5  7.1
Japan  5.7  5.4  4.6  4.7  4.8  4.5  4.1  3.8  3.6  4.1
Korea  4.4  3.9  4.1  4.0  3.9  3.6  3.4  3.6  3.1  3.7
Malaysia  5.4  5.6  5.4  6.2  6.0  6.5  6.3  6.1  5.6  6.3
Philippines  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  7.1  6.4  8.1  8.5  6.8  8.4  7.9
Singapore  4.9  4.5  4.2  3.9  5.2  4.6  4.5  3.9  4.0  4.4
Taiwan  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  5.1  6.2  6.5  6.8  6.5  6.6  6.7
Thailand  10.8  11.0  11.7  11.2  10.2  9.8  9.3  7.8  7.4  9.8
uS  4.7  4.8  5.1  4.9  5.2  5.4  5.3  5.2  5.2  5.3
Gernany  5.3  5.5  5.5  5.7  5.6  5.2  5.1  4.9  5.0  4.7
Note:  Table Al  reports means, standard deviations, and sample sizes.
As a further comparison of the performance of East Asian corporates, we plot the average
1988-96 ROA  for  corporates  in  all  other  countries  that  report  to  Worldscope  (Figure  1).
Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia have the highest ROAs in this sample of 46 countries,
while Taiwan and Malaysia are close behind.  At the other end, Korea and Japan have the lowest
ROAs in the sample, together with Norway, Sweden, and Austria. Singapore and Hong Kong
also have relatively low ROAs in real local currency.
3  For all companies listed on the DAX in  Frankfurt, and for all NYSE companies in the US.





































Australia  .. 









3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
ROA
5Next we calculate the return on assets in US dollars, adjusted for the effects of currency
movements (Table 2).  This measure of  performance presents the  point of  view of  an
international  investor  who can allocate  resources  across  several  countries.  With the exception  of
Japan (6.6%)  and Taiwan  (8.4%),  all East  Asian countries  have US dollars  ROAs  higher than the
US median (8.7%). The Philippines  (18.7%),  Thailand  (14.7%),  and Indonesia  (13.0%)  have the
highest  average  returns over  the 1988-96  period.
Table  2: Return  on Assets  for Nine Asian  Countries,  Germany  and the US
(%,  medians, in nominal US dollars) i
Country  1988  1989  J  1990  1991-  1992  J  1993  j  1994  j  1995  1996  1988-96
_~~~=  __  _,.__ 
Hong Kong  8.0  8.4  7.2  12.9  14.3  12.5  I1  15  8.0  10.3  10.3
Indonesia  n.a.  n.a.  16.0  13.7  12.6  15.3  11.7  10.7  11.2  13.0
Japan  6.5  -6.0  13.3  14.8  7.0  16.2  15.6  1.0  -9.2  6.6
Korea  25.1  10.3  7.3  7.2  6.4  5.9  12.1  9.9  -1.0  9.2
Malaysia  -0.8  8.8  7.2  9.9  14.8  6.1  15.5  12.2  9.5  9.2
Philippines  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  23.2  21.2  5.4  29.4  7.5  16.5  17.2
Singapore  8.9  9.4  15.6  13.6  6.9  9.3  16.4  9.0  6.8  10.7
Taiwan  n.a.  n.a  n.a  6.2  12.0  4.6  12.4  6.3  8.9  8.4
Thailand  13.9  14.6  19.3  16.9  13.4  13.1  16.6  13.2  11.5  14.7
US  8.7  9.6  10.5  9.1  8.3  84  7.9  8.0  8.1  8.7
The  high  returns  in  Table  2  are  driven  to  some  extent  by  the  real  exchange  rate
appreciation in the respective countries.  Correcting for the real exchange rate appreciation vis-?a-
vis the US dollar,  we find significantly  lower  ROAs. For example,  the return in US dollars  once
a correction is made for real currency appreciation is 8.4% in Korea in 1988.  Mathematically,
this is nothing else than the sum of the real ROA in Korean won (4.4%)  and the inflation rate in
the United States (4 .0%)-all  other terms cancel out in the calculation.  This implies that the
relative comparisons of the ROAs corrected for real exchange rate appreciations are the same as
those in Table 1.
Our  third  measure  of profitability  is  operational margin,  calculated  as  the  difference
between sales and costs of good sold, as a share of sales (Table 3). The liability structure or other
income  and  expenses  of the  corporate do  not  influence this  measure  either,  but  the  capital
intensity of the individual corporate does.  The operational margin measure  shows less cross-
country differences and has been stable for most countries throughout the period.  The cross-
country differences may indicate that firms across East Asia were exposed to differing degree of
(international) competition. Relatively lower-margin producers?  seem to be Singapore, followed
by Hong Kong, Malaysia and Korea.  Surprisingly, Japanese firms have higher-margins on goods
sold  ratios than these  developing  countries,  which may  reflect the  high  capital  intensity  of
Japanese firms and the, often-argued, lower level of competition within Japan.  Relatively high-
margin producers are the Philippines,;Indonesia and Thailand, which may reflect the degree of
domestic competition, the lower wages and high share of natural resources in their exports (the
later especially for Indonesia).  No strong trend appears-  over time, albeit there is some decrease
6in operational margins for Hong Kong, Indonesia and Singapore, possibly reflecting their higher
wage growth while at the same time they were facing increased competition.
Table 3: Operational Margin for Nine Asian Countries, US and Germany
(%, medians)
Country  1988  1989  1990  1991 [ 1992  1993  1  1994  1995  1  1996  1988-96
Hong  Kong  23.5  19.5  22.2  19.6  17.4  16.6  17.3  14.6  14.2  18.7
Indonesia  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  35.7  33.3  34.4  32.8  31.2  30.6  32.9
Japan  22.2  22.7  22.9  22.4  21.9  21.8  21.8  23.1  23.3  22.1
Korea  13.7  16.8  17.3  16.9  19.2  18.7  19.6  21.4  22.1  19.6
Malaysia  16.4  16.3  17.1  17.3  17.6  17.4  18.4  19.5  25.5  18.1
Philippines  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  36.1  26.4  26.4  27.5  30.8  33.3  27.7
Singapore  17.3  16.7  16.8  15.5  15.5  15.2  14.1  13.6  13.1  14.9
Taiwan  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  25.4  21.4  22.7  22.6  22.3  21.9  22.6
Thailand  21.9  24.3  25.7  27.3  25.9  25.1  24.9  24.7  22.7  25.2
US  14.1  13.9  14.1  14.3  15.5  14.0  14.7  14.8  14.6  14.4
Gennany  13.2  13.4  13.7  13.5  13.8  14.1  15.6  16.7  17.1  14.6
Note:  Table A2 reports means, standard deviations, and sample sizes.
The  cross-country  differences  in  returns  on  assets  do  not  reflect themselves  directly  in
differences in sales growth, which are also more variable over time (Table 4).  Most East Asian
corporates recorded on average high, real sales growth over the period.  Malaysia, Indonesia and
Thailand stand out, with  11.9%, 10.6% and 9.7% on average, followed by Taiwan with  9.3%.
Other countries also  had high  sales growth rates, which are about double those  of Germany
(2.6%) and the US (3.7%).  The country with the lowest corporate sales growth in East Asia is
Japan,  averaging 7.7%. These high  sales growth rates mirror the high  growth in  export  and
domestic demand that has characterized this region over the last decade.  We do observe some
slowdown,  however,  in  1996 in  sales  growth  for Indonesia, Japan,  Singapore,  Taiwan,  and
Thailand, possibly reflecting lower exports growth rates.
Table 4: Real Sales Growth (Year-on-Year) for Nine Asian Countries,
Germany and the United States
(%, medians)
Country  1989 J  1990  1991 [ 1992  1993 ] 1994  1995 [ 1996  11988-96
Hong Kong  10.1  11.6  10.2  12.4  9.8  9.4  9.7  11.8  9.2
Indonesia  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  10.7  12.1  12.4  9.4  8.3  10.6
Japan  7.4  8.2  8.4  8.3  8.8  8.5  7.2  4.3  7.7
Korea  8.4  8.7  8.2  8.3  7.6  7.3  7.2  8.6  8.2
Malaysia  9.7  12.3  11.8  12.7  13.1  12.6  11.7  11.9  11.9
Philippines  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  8.4  6.7  7.6  10.6  12.2  8.2
Singapore  8.4  8.6  8.1  9.4  11.6  11.8  10.2  7.7  8.7
Taiwan  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  7.1  11.3  10.3  9.7  8.4  9.3
Thailand  11.6  10.3  10.8  9.6  8.3  10.1  10.7  5.7  9.7
US  4.3  3.4  -1.8  4.3  2.8  6.9  4.1  4.3  3.7
Germany  5.0  4.4  5.1  1.1  -4.2  2.3  1.3  4.7  2.6
Note:  Table A3 reports means, standard deviations, and sample sizes.
7That these sales growth rates were maintained at such a high level-and  at rates very similar
across countries-reflects in part the high investment rates in this region (Table 5).  We measure
investment growth as new  dollar investments as a  share  of existing fixed assets.  Over this
period, Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand stand out, with investment rates of up to  13%, and in
some years  even or more, followed by  Malaysia, the Philippines, and  Singapore, with  rates
averaging about 10%.  Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan had growth in investment in fixed assets
of about 8.  Japan has had low investment rates especially since 1990.  This probably reflects in
part its sustained financial and corporate crisis since the early 1990s.
Table 5: Capital Investment for Nine East Asian Countries,
Germany,  and the United  States,  1988-1996
(%,  medians)
Country  1988  1989  1 990  1991  1 992  1 993  1994  1995  1996 11988-96
Hong  Kong  14.3  16.6  8.3  7.6  7.2  19.8  7.6  5.8  9.3  8.3
Indonesia  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  12.4  13.4  8.6  15.8  13.8  11.8  12.7
Japan  11.6  14.2  8.3  4.6  7.6  6.8  7.3  7.5  7.1  8.0
Korea  15.6  13.8  13.2  19.6  11.6  11.2  12.2  12.4  13.7  13.6
Malaysia  8.6  7.6  8.9  9.6  11.3  13.4  15.2  14.6  16.1  10.7
Philippines  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  9.1  8.9  7.8  13.5  14.1  14.5  10.8
Singapore  7.8  7.6  7.4  8.8  9.6  11.3  13.4  12.5  13.5  10.4
Taiwan  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  14.3  8.2  8.4  8.7  11.2  8.6  8.7
Thailand  10.4  12.9  12.3  15.0  14.9  15.0  14.7  14.5  5.8  13.8
US  3.8  4.1  3.0  -1.4  4.0  2.6  6.4  3.7  3.8  3.4
Germany  1  4.9  4.8  4.2  5.0  0.9  -3.8  2.1  1.3  4.6  2.5
Note:  Table A4 reports means, standard deviations, and sample sizes.
4.  Financial  structures
The degree of riskiness inherent in the liability structures of East Asian corporates is evident
in the data. The high investment rates, and relatively low ROAs for some countries, meant that
external financing had to  be  large as internal sources of capital, i.e., retained earnings, were
limited.  This high  external financing, mostly from the banking  systems, has been always  a
characteristic of the East Asian Miracle. Leverage, defined as total debt over equity, remained
then also high for many East Asian countries, much above that in other developing countries and
many developed countries (Table 6).  The highest leverage over this period was in case of Korea,
about five times the lowest, Taiwan.  Malaysia and Singapore were  also low; leverage in the
Philippines, while rising, was still much below that of Indonesia and Thailand.
8Table 6: Leverage for Nine Asian Countries,
Germany and the US
(%,  means)
Country  J 1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 [ 1994  1  1995 J 1996  1T1988-96
Hong Kong  1.832  2.311  1.783  2.047  1.835  1.758  2.273  1.980  1.559  1.902
Indonesia  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  1.943  2.097  2.054  1.661  2.115  1.878  1.951
Japan  2.994  2.843  2.871  2.029  2.042  2.057  2.193  2.367  2.374  2.302
Korea  2.820  2.644  3.105  3.221  3.373  3.636  3.530  3.776  3.545  3.467
Malaysia  0.727  0.810  1.010  0.610  0.627  0.704  0.991  1.103  1.176  0.908
Philippines  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.830  1.186  1.175  1.148  1.150  1.285  1.129
Singapore  0.765  0.922  0.939  0.887  0.856  1.102  0.862  1.037  1.049  0.936
Taiwan  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  0.679  0.883  0.866  0.894  0.796  0.802  0.820
Thailand  1.602  1.905  2.159  2.010  1.837  1.914  2.126  2.224  2.361  2.008
US  0.798  0.848  0.904  0.972  1.059  1.051  1.066  1.099  1.125  1.034
Germany  1.535  1.552  1.582  1.594  1.507  1.534  1.512  1.485  1.472  1.514
Note:  Table A5 reports medians, standard deviations, and sample sizes.
Most East Asian countries saw some increase in leverage in the last few years: this was most
notable for Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand.  Japan had seen some de-leveraging earlier in
the decade, possibly as there was some financial retrenchment, in the early 1990s, but lack of
equity and corporate sector difficulties may have meant that no new equity was raised and loans
were rolled over in the later part of the period.  Leverage consequently rose.  The rise in leverage
in the Philippines is probably the result of its reforms in the mid-1980s, which led to revived
corporate and financial sectors and better financing possibilities.
To study the riskiness of the financial structures of East Asian corporates, we next compare
their average 1988-96 leverage ratios with the leverage ratios in the other Worldscope countries
(Figure 2).  Korean and Japanese firms have the highest leverage among all corporates in this
group of countries, while companies in Thailand, Indonesia, and Hong Kong also have among
the ten highest leverage ratios.  At the opposite extreme, Taiwanese firms show relatively low
leverage ratios.  Firms in  the Philippines,  Singapore, and Malaysia also  have below-average
ratios.  The pattern across other regions is also interesting.  Western European countries typically
display high leverage ratios, with Swiss firms having leverage almost as high as Japanese firms.
In  contrast,  corporates  in  South  American  countries  (Peru,  Chile,  Argentina,  Venezuela,
Colombia) have low leverage, reflecting the less deep banking systems of these countries.
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10Long-term debt (as a share of total debt) has been low across the whole period in all East
Asian countries (Table 7).  Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand stand out with less than 1/3.  Japan
and the Philippines have the highest share, l/2,  while the others are about 0.43.  In contrast, about
3/4 of debt of US corporates is long term, while in Germany the ratio is 0.55. In spite of the large
attention to the role of short-term debt in the East Asian financial crisis, these data do not suggest
a massive buildup in short-term debt for the East Asian countries, at least up to the end of 1996,
but rather a consistently low share of long-term debt.  In fact, only Japan saw some decrease in
the share of long-term debt.  As these data do not distinguish foreign exchange from domestic
debt, it can of course be that the composition may have shifted away from short-term domestic
debt toward short-term foreign exchange debt.
Table  7: Long  Term Debt Share  for Nine Asian Countries,
Germany,  and the US
(%, medians)
County  |1988  1989 |  1990 J  1991 J  1992  1993  1994 ] 1995  1996  [1988-96
Hong Kong  59.7  59.5  53.8  56.5  44.7  44.7  40.7  37.3  36.4  44.9
Indonesia  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  52.4  40.8  39.6  41.6  41.8  43.3  43.1
Japan  49.9  54.1  53.8  49.9  49.4  51.7  47.7  44.4  40.8  48.4
Korea  55.7  47.2  49.8  49.8  44.2  43.7  41.4  40.4  41.5  43.7
Malaysia  35.8  35.5  32.5  27.1  26.9  26.6  27.2  27.8  29.9  29.2
Philippines  n.a.  na.  n.a.  57.2  53.1  50.3  50.2  49.8  51.4  52.2
Singapore  57.2  55.4  54.1  33.8  33.8  33.9  40.2  38.6  41.1  43.3
Taiwan  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  53.9  44.4  32.8  34.6  34.3  38.9  35.9
Thailand  58.1  49.8  38.8  34.3  25.2  26.4  27.6  32.9  32.8  30.9
US  77.7  77.2  76.3  76.7  75.8  76.2  75.2  74.6  74.1  75.9
Germany  56.8  55.4  54.5  53.9  55.2  55.4  55.4  55.3  54.7  55.3
Note:  Table A6 reports means, standard deviations, and sample sizes.
The international comparison of the maturity of debt structure (Figure 3) reveals that most
East Asian countries rank below European and Latin American countries in their share of long
term  debt. 4 Among  East Asian  countries, only  corporations  from the  Philippines  have  an
average share of long-term debt greater than 50%.  There is a general tendency for corporates in
richer countries to have more long-term debt, as observed by Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic
(1998) and others.  Some other, low-incomeAsian countries (Sri Lanka, Pakistan, China) have
indeed low shares of long term debt.  But many of the higher-income East Asian countries are
outliers to this pattern, as they rely less on long-term debt than what would be expected on the
basis of their  per-capita income level.  Japan, for example, ranks below  many other OECD-
countries.  Among developing countries, Chile stands out as country with a very high share of
long-term debt.
4We  present the share of long-term debt, rather than the share of short-term debt as the latter can underestimate the
amount of liabilities with a short maturity as it excludes, for example, trade credits.
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12The  structure  of  debt  (domestic  vs.  foreign:  short  vs.  long  term)  was  different  across
countries, however.  Figure  4  and  table  A7 report the  distribution  of debt  across  these four
categories in 1996 for the six countries most affected by the crisis. Korea has the highest share of
foreign short-term debt share, followed by Malaysia and Thailand. In contrast, the Philippines
and Taiwan have the largest share of domestic long-term debt.
Figure 4: Distribution of Debt in Six East Asian Countries:
Foreign  Vs. Domestic  and Short  Vs. Long Term
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The data also suggest large differences across countries in interest payment coverage. This is
calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (but adding back depreciation)-that
is, EBITDA or operational cash flow-to  interest expenses (Figure 5). With the low interest rates
in Japan, Japanese corporates needed to devote only a  small fraction of EBITDA on interest
payments, so the interest coverage ratio is about 8 in  1996, followed by Taiwan with 6.  1.  Thai
and Korean corporates had the lowest interest coverage ratios, about 2.7 and 2.1 respectively.
13Hong Kong, Malaysian, Indonesian and Philippine corporates averaged between 3 and 4 while
Singaporean frmns averaged 4.5.
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5.  Summary
There were large differences in perfornmace across countries as measures by return on
assets.  These differences did not show UP as much in sales growth as investment rates were high
and driven output rates in many countries. The high investment and relatively low profitability
meant that external financing had to remain high in most countries, with high leverage as outsid
equity was used sparingly. While there were no strong trends in the early  1  990s, leverage did
increase  in  Korea  and  Thailand  in  the  later  years,  signaling  the  vulnerability  in  corporate
financial structures, that now has become a very apparent factor in triggering and aggravating the
financial crisis.  Across countries, the share of (foreign) short-term debt differed considerably in
1996, as did the ability of firms to cover interest payments from earniings.  The underlying causes
of  decreased profitability  and  increased  leverage are still  elusive, and  will  be  studied more
extensively in future research.
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15Annex: Comparisons  of Main  Results  with Other Studies
To check the accuracy of our calculations  (and the reliability  of the data), we compare
some of our main results with other studies that have looked at the same financial  data for the
same countries and similar time periods.  First, we compare  the results of real ROA with the
calculations  in Demirguc-Kunt  and Maksimovic  (1995) and Glen, Singh, and Matthias  (1998).
For consistency,  we convert  the nominal  ROAs  of these studies  also to real ROAs using the same
source for inflation  rates.  The results are remarkably  consistent  across the three studies. Next,
we look at the leverage ratios we generate and compare them with the Demirguc-Kunt  and
Maksimovic  calculations. With the exception  of Japan  and Singapore,  where our leverage  figure
is smaller than theirs, the other numbers are similar.  Finally, we compare  the interest coverage
variable with those reported by Goldman Sachs (1998). Overall, there don't seem to be any
major differences.
Comparisons  with Other  Studies
(averages  over  the sample  period)
Real ROA  Leverage  Interest  Coverage
Study  Our  study  DM, 1995  GSM, 1998  Our study  DM, 1995  Our study  OS,  1998
Time Period  1988-96  1983-93  1980-94  1988-96  1983-93  1996  1996
Hong Kong  4.4  4.6  n.a.  2.273  1.322  3.64  6.71
Indonesia  10.7  n.a.  n.a.  1.661  n.a.  4.02  n.a.
Japan  4.8  5.2  n.a.  2.302  3.688  7.57  n.a.
Korea  4.3  4.4  4.6  3.531  3.662  2.12  2.74
Malaysia  7.5  7.0  7.3  0.991  0.935  3.48  n.a.
Philippines  9.4  n.a.  na.  1.148  na.  3.11  3.09
Singapore  5.5  5.8  n.a.  0.862  1.232  4.32  4.06
Taiwan  6.8  n.a.  n.a.  0.894  n.a.  6.13  n.a.
Thailand  10.2  9.2  11.3  2.126  2.215  2.76  3.34
Source: DM - Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1995); GSM - Glen,
Singh, Matthias (1998); GS - Goldman Sachs (1998)
16TABLE  Al: Real  ROA  in Local  Currency  (EBIT  over  Total  Assets,  Adjusted  for Inflation), 1988-96 
Couintry  E1988  1  1989  1990  ]  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1988-96
Hong  Kong  Mean  0.053  0.055  0.047  0.045  0.042  0.044  0.038  0.042  0.044  0.044
Std.  Dev.  0.044  0.052  0.041  0.038  0.044  0.051  0.035  0.051  0.052  0.048
Median  0.051  0.053  0.049  0.048  0.045  0.038  0.039  0.039  0.041  0.046
No. of Obs.  88  117  189  236  293  331  388  491  476  2465
Indonesia  Mean-  - 0.128  0.126  0.122  0.112  0.108  0.098  0.095  0.107
Std.  Dev.  - - 0.116  0.114  0.105  0.082  0.073  0.068  0.076  0.088
Median  - - 0.094  0.091  0.086  0.079  0.074  0.062  0.065  0.071
No. of Obs.  - - 8  107  235  248  260  279  268  1396
Japan  Mean  0.068  0.065  0.060  0.053  0.054  0.051  0.047  0.044  0.043  0.048
Std.  Dev.  0.052  0.053  0.049  0.041  0.042  0.040  0.038  0.039  0.039  0.045
Median  0.057  0.054  0.046  0.047  0.048  0.045  0.041  0.038  0.036  0.041
No. of Obs.  749  806  921  2004  2178  2230  2259  2250  2217  15893
Korea  Mean  0.047  0.050  0.048  0.046  0.045  0.042  0.048  0.043  0.039  0.043
Std.  Dev.  0.058  0.056  0.057  0.054  0.053  0.047  0.053  0.049  0.046  0.053
Median  0.044  0.039  0.041  0.040  0.039  0.036  0.034  0.036  0.031  0.037
No. of Obs.  66  79  82  151  208  314  329  325  258  1789
Malaysia  Mean  0.071  0.072  0.076  0.082  0.084  0.079  0.078  0.074  0.069  0.075
Std.  Dev.  0.096  0.091  0.091  0.093  0.112  0.088  0.082  0.096  0.092  0.092
Median  0.054  0.056  0.054  0.062  0.060  0.065  0.063  0.061  0.056  0.063
No. of Obs.  193  218  298  360  408  485  545  620  658  3567
Philippines  Mean-  - - 0.117  0.092  0.089  0.101  0.084  0.091  0.094
Std. Dev.  - - 0.175  0.141  0.124  0.137  0.124  0.126  0.125
Median  - - - 0.071  0.064  0.081  0.085  0.068  0.084  0.079
No. of Obs.  - - - 40  89  106  123  152  145  675
Singapore  Mean  0.069  0.059  0.053  0.051  0.054  0.057  0.061  0.058  0.048  0.055
Std.  Dev.  0.072  0.062  0.064  0.076  0.067  0.061  0.087  0.092  0.094  0.076
Median  0.049  0.045  0.042  0.039  0.052  0.046  0.045  0.039  0.040  0.044
No. of Obs.  107  123  159  186  208  249  270  294  298  1789
Taiwan  Mean  - - - 0.070  0.071  0.072  0.067  0.066  0.068  0.068
Std. Dev.  - - 0.066  0.074  0.074  0.059  0.074  0.080  0.073
Median  - - 0.051  0.062  0.065  0.068  0.065  0.066  0.067
No. of Obs.  - - - 24  70  119  205  247  214  894
Thailand  Mean  0.114  0.113  0.122  0.116  0.113  0.108  0.104  0.094  0.091  0.102
Std. Dev.  0.132  0.129  0.143  0.137  0.126  0.117  0.116  0.124  0.115  0.119
Median  0.108  0.110  0.117  0.112  0.102  0.098  0.093  0.078  0.074  0.098
No. of Obs.  116  157  220  275  310  403  437  437  427  2880
17TABLE  A2: OPERATIONAL  MARGIN,  1988-96
Country  1988  J  1989  J  1990  1991  T  1992  1993  1994  f  1995  ]  1996  J 1988-96
Hong  Kong  Mean  0.261  0.254  0.266  0.247  0.237  0.234  0.220  0.192  0.191  0236
Std.  Dev.  0.061  0.063  0.078  0.067  - 0.062  0.062  0.060  0.046  0.048  0.062
Median  0.235  0.195  0.222  0.196  0.174  0.166  0.173  0.146  0.142  0.187
No. of Obs.  75  94  145  182  230  252  304  406  403  2091
Indonesia  Mean  - - - 0.386  0.360  0.362  0.358  0.345  0.334  0.358
Std. Dev.  - - - 0:098  0.087  0.089  0.087  0.088  0.085  0.088
Median  - - - 0.357  0.333  0.344  0.328  0.312  0.306  0.329
No. of Obs.  - - - 91  196  209  216  235  226  1173
Japan  Mean  0.242  0.246  0.247  0.247  0.245  0.242  0.244  0.255  0.256  0.247
Std.  Dev.  0.044  0.045  0.045  0.045  0.046  0.046  0.048  0.051  0.051  0.047
Median  0.222  0.227  0.229  0.224  0.219  0.218  0.218  0.231  0.233  0.221
No. of Obs  739  793  906  1954  2124  2179  2209  2200  2168  15272
Korea  Mean  0.188  0.210  0.230  0.210  0.237  0.212  0.225  0.232  0.233  0.220
Std.  Dev.  0.039  0.049  0.065  0.035  0.051  0.034  0.037  0.038  0.035  0.040
Median  0.137  0.168  0.173  0.169  0.192  0.187  0.196  0.214  0.221  0.196
No. of Obs.  66  78  82  136  162  264  282  279  214  1563
Malaysia  Mean  0.181  0.189  0.196  0.201  0.209  0.202  0.210  0.205  0.221  0.202
Std.  Dev.  0.024  0.030  0.033  0.032  0.038  0.037  0.041  0.051  0.046  0.037
Median  0.164  0.163  0.171  0.173  0.176  0.174  0.184  0.195  0.255  0.181
No. of Obs.  150  175  218  275  308  340  351  384  373  2574
Philippines  Mean  - - - 0.374  0.299  0.284  0.283  0.304  0.300  0.307
Std. Dev.  - - 0.131  0.093  0.101  0.108  0.133  0.135  0.125
Median  - 0.361  0.264  0.264  0.275  0.308  0.333  0.277
No. of Obs.  - - - 33  71  84  99  123  115  525
Singapore  Mean  0.207  0.203  0.211  0.193  0.195  0.200  0.191  0.187  0.172  0.194
Std.  Dev.  0.038  0.036  0.043  0.040  0.039  0.044  0.041  0.040  0.050  0.042
Median  0.173  0.167  0.168  0.155  0.155  0.152  0.141  0.136  0.131  0.149
No. of Obs.  85  98  122  145  163  180  197  208  195  1393
Taiwan  Mean  - 0.290  0.238  0.234  0.247  0.254  0.248  0.252
Std. Dev.  - 0.072  0.043  0.047  0.047  0.051  0.049  0.051
Median  - 0.254  0.214  0.227  0.227  0.223  0.219  0.226
No. of Obs.  - 24  60  103  187  231  199  804
Thailand  Mean  0.255  0.291  0.289  0.293  0.288  0.285  0.280  0.284  0.261  0.281
Std. Dev.  0.051  0.067  0.068  0.078  0.076  0.075  0.071  0.076  0.069  0.074
Median  0.219  0.243  0.257  0.273  0.259  0.251  0.249  0.247  0.227  0.252
No. of Obs.  115  155  216  257  287  349  380  380  376  2515
18TABLE  A3: REAL  SALES  GROWTH  (Year-on-year)
Country  1989  |  1990  1991  |  1992  |  1993  |  1994  [  1995  1996  |  1988-96
Hong Kong  Mean  0.117  0.135  0.121  0.159  0.114  0.108  0.126  0.163  0.130
Std. Dev.  0.178  0.214  0.198  0.234  0.192  0.176  0.257  0.312  0.248
Median  0.101  0.116  0.102  0.124  0.098  0.094  0.097  0.118  0.092
No. of Obs.  77  96  142  196  260  287  307  352  1717
Indonesia  Mean  - - - 0.128  0.141  0.169  0.115  0.104  0.131
Std. Dev.  - - 0.189  0.227  0.243  0.196  0.216  0.206
Median  - - 0.107  0.121  0.124  0.094  0.083  0.106
No. of Obs.  - - - 106  224  236  241  250  1057
Japan  Mean  0.090  0.106  0.097  0.095  0.118  0.108  0.102  0.072  0.099
Std. Dev.  0.182  0.196  0.207  0.213  0.224  0.206  0.186  0.177  0.207
Median  0.074  0.082  0.084  0.083  0.088  0.085  0.072  0.043  0.077
No. of Obs  725  763  815  1534  1526  1533  1633  1717  10246
Korea  Mean  0.112  0.124  0.116  0.124  0.105  0.095  0.097  0.106  0.110
Std. Dev.  0.182  0.186  0.191  0.217  0.187  0.230  0.213  0.223  0.226
Median  0.084  0.087  0.082  0.083  0.076  0.073  0.072  0.086  0.082
No. of Obs.  61  64  71  122  169  258  249  155  1149
Malaysia  Mean  0.127  0.168  0.159  0.153  0.178  0.192  0.146  0.149  0.157
Std. Dev.  0.245  0.289  0.310  0.324  0.351  0.362  0.317  0.299  0.325
Median  0.097  0.123  0.118  0.127  0.131  0.126  0.117  0.119  0.119
No. of Obs.  147  168  245  316  376  504  562  585  2903
Philippines  Mean  - - - 0.122  0.086  0.123  0.141  0.153  0.124
Std.  Dev.  - 0.235  0.196  0.214  0.271  0.305  0.278
Median  - 0.084  0.067  0.076  0.106  0.122  0.082
No. of Obs.  - - 32  71  87  104  114  409
Singapore  Mean  0.109  0.112  0.098  0.152  0.142  0.159  0.121  0.097  0.117
Std. Dev.  0.221  0.196  0.217  0.317  0.296  0.324  0.274  0.195  0.193
Median  0.084  0.086  0.081  0.094  0.116  0.118  0.102  0.077  0.087
No. of Obs.  75  104  135  158  182  234  245  252  1392
Taiwan  Mean  - - - 0.089  0.142  0.122  0.113  0.104  0.098
Std.  Dev.  - - 0.178  0.271  0.289  0.271  0.241  0.208
Median  - - 0.071  0.113  0.103  0.097  0.084  0.093
No. of Obs.  - - - 21  62  104  176  180  543
Thailand  Mean  0.133  0.115  0.134  0.128  0.109  0.126  0.138  0.072  0.118
Std. Dev.  0.293  0.284  0.301  0.277  0.201  0.294  0.311  0.176  0.223
Median  0.116  0.103  0.108  0.096  0.083  0.101  0.107  0.057  0.097
No. of Obs.  113  151  207  251  261  347  367  332  2029
19TABLE  A4: CAPITAL  GROWTH  (new investment  as  a share of existing fixed assets)
Country  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  l  1995  1996  1988-96
Hong Kong  Mean  0.165  0.190  0.122  0.116  0.121  0.265  0.123  0.077  0.151  0.145
Std.  Dev.  0.271  0.298  0.262  0.307  0.331  0.354  0.246  0.232  0.307  0.274
Median  0.143  0.166  0.083  0.076  0.072  0.198  0.076  0.058  0.093  0.083
No. of Obs  46  51  70  115  156  201  227  279  352  1497
Indonesia  Mean  - - - 0.150  0.206  0.163  0.271  0.166  0.164  0.184
Std. Dev.  - - 0.254  0.327  0.362  0.382  0.245  0.284  0.286
Median  - - 0.124  0.134  0.086  0.158  0.138  0.118  0.127
No. of Obs  - - 85  107  232  247  253  267  1191
Japan  Mean  0.128  0.167  0.099  0.055  0.085  0.076  0.082  0.081  0.076  0.094
Std.  Dev.  0.119  0.140  0.109  0.106  0.104  0.111  0.109  0.109  0.096  0.096
Median  0.116  0.142  0.083  0.046  0.076  0.068  0.073  0.075  0.071  0.080
No. of Obs  732  749  808  911  1996  2156  2214  2230  2225  14021
Korea  Mean  0.204  0.195  0.178  0.245  0.157  0.128  0.142  0.136  0.154  0.171
Std. Dev.  0.186  0.196  0.191  0.267  0.132  0.253  0.288  0.214  0.218  0.204
Median  0.156  0.138  0.132  0.196  0.116  0.112  0.122  0.124  0.137  0.136
No. of Obs  57  64  72  81  148  203  309  308  242  1484
Malaysia  Mean  0.146  0.132  0.172  0.179  0.162  0.212  0.237  0.175  0.189  0.178
Std.  Dev.  0.284  0.264  0.243  0.271  0.265  0.275  0.334  0.246  0.274  0.216
Median  0.086  0,076  0.089  0.096  0.113  0.134  0.152  0.146  0.161  0.107
No. of Obs  147  190  217  297  359  398  481  541  :593  3223
Philippines  Mean.  - - 0.121  0.115  0.137  0.166  0.190  0.213  0.157
Std. Dev.  - 0.257  0.263  0.275  0.300  0.333  0.289  0.278
Median  - - 0.091  0.089  0.078  0.135  0.141  0.145  0.108
No.ofObs  - - - 31  43  95  110  128  148  555
Singapore  Mean  0.112  0.113  0.107  0.118  0.121  0.177  0.179  0.137  0.176  0.138
Std. Dev.  0.252  0.254  0.341  0.153  0.179  0.358  0.285  0.277  0.292  0.284
Median  0.078  0.076  0.074  0.088  0.096  0.113  0.134  0.125  0.135  0.104
No. of Obs  82  105  120  158  185  206  247  267  281  1651
Taiwan  Mean  - - - 0.171  0.124  0.119  0.123  0.168  0.125  0.138
Std. Dev.  - 0.192  0.096  0.127  0.184  0.325  0.213  0.186
Median  --  0.143  0.082  0.084  0.087  0.112  0.086  0.087
No. of Obs  - 16  24  70  118  201  212  641
Thailand  Mean  0.152  0.176  0.233  0.234  0.237  0.195  0.217  0.180  0.074  0.189
Std. Dev.  0.312  0.356  0.438  0.350  0.395  0.295  0.308  0.376  0.223  0.284
Median  0.104  0.129  0.123  0.150  0.149  0.150  0.147  0.145  0.058  0.138
No. of Obs  110  116  156  219  274  310  403  430  423  2441
20TABLE  A5: LEVERAGE  (Total  Debt  Over Common  Equity)
Country  |  |  1988  |  1989  I  1990  1991  1  1992  ]  1993  1994  1  1995  1  1996  11988-96
Hong Kong  Mean  1.832  2.311  1.783  2.047  1.835  1.758  2.273  1.980  1.559  1.902
Std. Dev.  2.351  3.215  3.102  4.085  3.624  3.508  4.917  4.907  3.799  4.568
Median  1.236  1.426  1.365  1.586  1.446  1.453  1.485  1.476  1.423  1.428
No.of Obs  86  114  176  218  275  303  355  475  463  2465
Indonesia  Mean  - - - 1.943  2.097  2.054  1.661  2.115  1.878  1.951
Std. Dev.  - - 2.893  2.992  3.158  2.626  2.958  2.137  2.857
Median  - - - 1.785  1.826  1.817  1.764  1.847  1.827  1.814
No.of Obs  - - 166  216  230  244  269  264  1396
Japan  Mean  2.994  2.843  2.871  2.029  2.042  2.057  2.193  2.367  2.374  2.302
Std. Dev.  3.102  2.901  3.014  3.817  4.228  4.541  4.218  5.107  4.857  4.676
Median  2.186  2.055  1.946  1.784  1.798  1.713  2.045  2.108  2.109  2.061
No.of Obs  847  898  1009  2206  2194  2227  2260  2252  2234  16117
Korea  Mean  2.820  2.644  3.105  3.221  3.373  3.636  3.530  3.776  3.545  3.467
Std. Dev.  2.362  2.001  2.019  3.573  3.512  4.454  5.001  4.397  4.853  4.962
Median  2.432  2.412  2.819  3.046  3.162  3.341  3.272  3.388  3.248  3.124
No.of Obs  66  79  82  146  203  310  324  321  258  1789
Malaysia  Mean  0.727  0.810  1.010  0.610  0.627  0.704  0.991  1.103  1.176  0.908
Std. Dev.  0.946  1.091  1.687  0.827  1.100  1.070  1.604  1.748  1.426  1.618
Median  0.612  0.642  0.689  0.615  0.628  0.647  0.728  0.824  0.898  0.775
No.of Obs  176  199  265  338  391  460  514  587  636  3567
Philippines  Mean  - - - 0.830  1.186  1.175  1.148  1.150  1.285  1.129
Std. Dev.  - 1.566  1.811  1.930  1.652  1.751  1.954  1.842
Median  - - 0.745  0.869  0.882  0.875  0.877  0.925  0.873
No.of Obs  - - 44  94  110  123  154  146  675
Singapore  Mean  0.765  0.922  0.939  0.887  0.856  1.102  0.862  1.037  1.049  0.936
Std. Dev.  1.082  1.610  1.551  2.571  2.041  2.254  2.111  2.118  2.685  2.241
Median  0.722  0.789  0.812  0.768  0.754  0.826  0.749  0.768  0.814  0.762
No.of Obs  106  121  149  181  198  229  247  275  283  1789
Taiwan  Mean  - - - 0.679  0.883  0.866  0.894  0.796  0.802  0.820
Std. Dev.  - - 0.691  0.879  0.906  1.082  0.991  1.162  0.945
Median  - - - 0.632  0.746  0.737  0.752  0.732  0.736  0.735
No.of Obs  - - 37  66  111  206  245  222  894
Thailand  Mean  1.602  1.905  2.159  2.010  1.837  1.914  2.126  2.224  2.361  2.008
Std. Dev.  2.163  3.382  2.662  3.095  2.648  2.409  2.653  2.261  2.778  2.524
Median  1.254  1.378  1.517  1.508  1.487  1.502  1.568  1.724  1.853  1.576
No.of Obs  161  197  235  272  309  400  431  434  427  2880
21TABLE  A6: LONG  TERM  DEBT  SHARE  OF  TOTAL  DEBT
Country  1988  1989  1990I  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  l  1996  1988-96
Hong Kong  Mean  0.576  0.565  0.522  0.527  0.495  0.442  0.424  0.398  0.404  0.455
Std. Dev.  0.349  0.330  0.307  0.326  0.295  0.251  0.231  0.209  0.205  0.256
Median  0.597  0.595  0.538  0.565  0.447  0.447  0.407  0.373  0.364  0.449
No.of  Obs  111  114  167  192  231  256  315  442  440  2301
Indonesia  Mean  - - 0.472  0.406  0.418  0.417  0.428  0.465  0.433
Std. Dev.  - - 0.280  0.213  0.218  0.210  0.224  0.259  0.232
Median  - - 0.524  0.408  0.396  0.416  0.418  0.433  0.431
No.of Obs  - - 72  151  167  176  207  201  978
Japan  Mean  0.520  0.541  0.527  0.495  0.492  0.510  0.472  0.443  0.416  0.491
Std.  Dev.  0.288  0.306  0.285  0.270  0.265  0.289  0.247  0.222  0.197  0.266
Median  0.499  0.541  0.538  0.499  0.494  0.517  0.477  0.444  0.408  0.484
No.of  Obs  701  788  894  1941  2108  2151  2181  2160  2124  15572
Korea  Mean  0.507  0.496  0.499  0.481  0.410  0.413  0.414  0.412  0.432  0.432
Std. Dev.  0.243  0.208  0.170  0.173  0.163  0.161  0.157  0.158  0.172  0.168
Median  0.557  0.472  0.498  0.498  0.442  0.437  0.414  0.404  0.415  0.437
No.of  Obs  65  78  82  146  195  305  317  313  256  1743
Malaysia  Mean  0.375  0.373  0.364  0.321  0.304  0.324  0.328  0.333  0.362  0.339
Std.  Dev.  0.187  0.182  0.171  0.135  0.122  0.135  0.139  0.146  0.170  0.150
Median  0.358  0.355  0.325  0.271  0.269  0.266  0.272  0.278  0.299  0.292
No.of  Obs  147  171  222  269  326  389  447  518  572  3061
Philippines  Mean  - - - 0.541  0.495  0.459  0.471  0.487  0.517  0.493
Std. Dev.  - 0.356  0.308  0.299  0.325  0.329  0.394  0.316
Median  0.572  0.531  0.503  0.502  0.498  0.514  0.522
No.of Obs  - - - 44  87  85  91  121  127  558
Singapore  Mean  0.593  0.586  0.489  0.407  0.392  0.397  0.446  0.408  0.420  0.442
Std.  Dev.  0.457  0.427  0.322  0.233  0.213  0.219  0.261  0.224  0.232  0.261
Median  0.572  0.554  0.541  0.338  0.338  0.339  0.402  0.386  0.411  0.433
No.of  Obs  101  108  121  159  178  203  221  250  267  1608
Taiwan  Mean  0.507  0.459  0.377  0.379  0.348  0.413  0.394
Std. Dev.  0.232  0.207  0.178  0.185  0.163  0.233  0.196
Median  0.539  0.444  0.328  0.346  0.343  0.389  0.359
No.of Obs  - - - 67  68  104  189  235  206  868
Thailand  Mean  0.517  0.496  0.431  0.387  0.261  0.301  0.332  0.361  0.369  0.363
Std.  Dev.  0.336  0.303  0.223  0.179  0.094  0.128  0.146  0.166  0.174  0.162
Median  0.581  0.498  0.388  0.343  0.252  0.264  0.276  0.329  0.328  0.309
No.of Obs  101  134  159  193  260  347  370  378  378  2323
22TABLE  A7: DISTIBUTION  OF DEBT;  FOREIGN  Vs DOMESTIC,  SHORT  Vs LONG  TERM
(Shares,  Median  1996)
Foreign  Short  Term  Foreign  Long Tern  Domestic  Short  Term  Domestic  Long Term
Indonesia  0.205  0.196  0.314  0.285
Korea  0.294  0.170  0.277  0.258
Malaysia  0.321  0.110  0.357  0.212
Philippines  0.197  0.213  0.255  0.335
Taiwan  0.223  0.192  0.239  0.346
Thailand  0.296  0.123  0.320  0.261
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